XVIII
THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS
July, 1846—February, 1847
The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate, Indeed Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations of the American government were therefore palpably Wrong. The programme of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[1]
Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled. By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen more clearly each day Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the responsibility for ofiensive operations naturally appealed to not a few. Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the enemy had no
- ↑ 4
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