their friends' consents, if they be never so ill used, yet you shall seldom see them complain, but set a good face on it.
IX.
Quod opera et virtute nostra partum est, majus bonum; quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum, est minus bonum."[1]
The reasons are, first, the future hope, because in the favours of others, or the good winds of fortune, we have no state or certainty; in our endeavours or abilities we have. So as when they have purchased us one good fortune, we have them as ready, and better edged, and inured to procure another.
The forms be: you have won this by play, you have not only the water, but you have the receipt, you can make it again if it be lost, &c.
Next, because these properties which we enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burden; whereas the other, which derive from ourselves, are like the freest parents, "absque aliquo inde reddendo:" and if they proceed from fortune or providence, yet they seem to touch us secretly with the reverence of the divine powers, whose favours we taste, and therefore work a kind of religious fear and restraint: whereas in the other kind, that comes to pass which the prophet speaketh, "lætantur et exultant, immolant plagis suis, et sacrificant reti suo."
Thirdly, because that which cometh unto us without our own virtue, yieldeth not that commendation and reputation: for actions of great felicity may draw wonder, but praise less; as Cicero said to Cæsar, "Quæ miremur, habemus; quæ laudemus, expectamus."
Fourthly, because the purchases of our own industry are joined commonly with labour and strife, which gives an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our desires more pleasant. "Suavis cibus a venatu."
On the other side, there be four countercolours to this colour, rather than reprehensions, because they be as large as the colour itself. First, because felicity seemeth to be a character of the favour and love of the divine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in ourselves, and respect and authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many casual things, whereunto the care or virtue of man cannot extend, and therefore seemeth to be a larger good; as when Cæsar said to the sailor, "Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus;" if he had said, "et virtutem ejus," it had been small comfort against a tempest, otherwise than if it might seem upon merit to induce fortune.
Next, whatsoever is done by virtue and industry, seems to be done by a kind of habit and art, and therefore open to be imitated and followed; where as felicity is inimitable: so we generally see that things of nature seem more excellent than things of art, because they be inimitable; for "quod imitabile est, potentia quadam vulgatum est."
Thirdly, felicity commendeth those things which come without our labour; for they seem gifts, and the other seem pennyworths; where upon Plutarch saith elegantly of the acts of Timoleon, who was so fortunate, compared with the acts of Agesilaus and Epaminondas; that they were like Homer's verses, they ran so easily and so well. And therefore it is the word we give unto poesy, terming it a happy vein, because facility seemeth ever to come from happiness.
Fourthly, this same "præter spem, vel præter expectatum," doth increase the price and pleasure of many things: and this cannot be incident to those things that proceed from our own care and compass.
X.
"Gradus privationis major videtur, quam gradus diminutionis; et rursus gradus inceptionia major videtur, quam gradus incrementii."[2]
It is a position in the mathematics, that there is no proportion between something and nothing, therefore the degree of nullity and quiddity or act, seemeth larger than the degree of increase and decrease; as to a "monoculus" it is more to lose one eye than to a man that hath two eyes. So if one have lost divers children, it is more grief to him to lose the last than all the rest; because he is "spes gregis." And therefore Sibylla, when she brought her three books, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had been "gradus privationis," and not "diminutionis."
This colour is reprehended first in those things, the use and service whereof resteth in sufficiency, competency, or determinate quantity: as if a man be to pay one hundred pounds upon a penalty, it is more to him to want twelve pence, than after that twelve pence supposed to be wanting, to want ten shillings more; so the decay of a man's estate seems to be most touched in the degree, when he first grows behind, more than afterwards, when he proves nothing worth. And hereof the common forms are, "Sera in fundo parsimonia," and, as good never a whit, as never the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that notion, "Corruptio unius, generatio alterius:" so that "gradus privationis" is many times less matter, because it gives the cause and motive to some new course. As when Demosthenes reprehended the people for hearkening to the conditions offered by King Philip, being not honourable nor equal, he saith they were but aliments of their sloth and weakness,
- ↑ That which is gotten by our own pains and industry is a greater good; that which comes by another man's courtesy, or the indulgence of fortune, is a lesser good."
- ↑ "The degree of privation seems greater than the degree of diminution; and again, the degree of inception (or beginning) seems greater than the degree of increase."
