are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions.
Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much per plexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.
But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, That to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative: so that a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, "Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest:" "Yea, but," saith Diagoras, "where are they painted that are drowned?" Let us behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature, as it were "monodica, sui juris;" yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man "communis mensura," have brought into Natural Philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods I to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars as if he had been an Ædilis, one that should havo set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature.
Let us consider, again, the false appearances imposed upon us by every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned opposition that Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth, until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.
And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, "Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;" yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to mitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are in separable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient.
There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the application of the differing
