dem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute tan tutu, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam facial; utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri; hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo." In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the Second, that he had applied himself to philosophy,"non ita disputandi causâ, sed ita vivendi." And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excellently saith,) "De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summâ nemo," may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, "Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat;" they need medicine, not only to assauge the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the psalm saith, that the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress, and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the hand maid, to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.
This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.
First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of the accidents; so in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune: for to the basis of the one, and the condition of the other our work is limited and tied. In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application.
"Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo;"
and so likewise,
"Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo."
But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.
So then the first article of this knowledge is, to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions; especially having regard to those differences which are most radical, in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered, "That there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small," (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name of magnanimity;) doth it not deserve as well to be considered, "That there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few?" So that some can divide themselves; others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once: and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as pusillanimity. And again, "That some minds are proportioned to that which, may be despatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins a far off and is to be won with length of pursuit;"
"Jam tum tenditque fovetque."
So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle; "that there is a disposition in conversation, (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self,) to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:" and deserveth it not much better to be considered, "that there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent,) to take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another? which is that properly which we call good-nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality
