There are various letters extant upon this subject, exhibiting the king's pecuniary distresses, his rash facility in making promises, and the discontent felt by the people at his improvidence, and partiality for his own countrymen.
Though evidently rejoicing at this windfall for his royal master, Bacon, regardless of the importunities of the attorney-general, refused to issue writes of ne exeat against the merchants till he had obtained evidence to warrant his interposition, and cautioned his majesty against granting the forfeitures accruing from this discovery. He entreated that a commission might be formed, impowering Sir E. Coke, the chancellor of the exchequer, the lord chief justice, and himself, to investigate this matter. These observations were well received, and immediately adopted by the king; and although informations were filed against a hundred and eighty, only twenty of the principal merchants were tried and convicted. They were fined to the amount of £100,000, which, by the intercession of Buckingham, was afterwards remitted to about £30,000. The rest of the prosecutions were stayed at his instance, intercession having been made to him by letters from the States-General, and probably by the merchants themselves, in the way in which he was usually approached by applicants.
While this cause was pending, the Earl of Suffolk, lord treasurer, was prosecuted, with his lady, in the Star Chamber, for trafficking with the public money to the amount of £50,000; and they were sentenced to imprisonment and fine, not, according to the judgment of Sir Edward Coke, of £100,000, but of £30,000. Bacon commended Coke to the king, as having done his part excellently, but pursued his own constant course, activity in detecting the offence, and moderation in punishing the offender. After a short confinement they were released at the intercession of Buckingham, and the fine reduced to £7,000.
The motives by which Buckingham was influenced in this and similar remissions, may possibly be collected from his conduct in the advancement of Lord Chief Justice Montagu, who, for a sum of £20,000, was appointed to the treasurership, vacated by the removal of Lord Suffolk, and was created a peer; for which offence this dispenser of the king's favours was, in the reign of Charles the First, impeached by the Commons; but he, after the death of Bacon and of the king, solemnly denied the accusation, by protesting "that the sum was a voluntary loan to the king by the lord treasurer, after his promotion, and not an advance to obtain the appointment."
Such were the occupations to which this philosopher was doomed; occupations which, even as chancellor, he regretted, saying, most truly, "I know these things do not pertain to me; for any pait is to acquit the king's office towards God, in the maintenance of the prerogative, and to oblige the hearts of the people to him by the administration of justice."
From these political expedients he turned to his more interesting judicial duties. How strenuously he exerted himself in the discharge of them may be seen in his honest exultation to Buckingham, and may be easily conceived by those who know how indefatigable genius is in any business in which it is interested: how ardent and strenuous it is in encountering and subduing all difficulties to which it is opposed.
In a letter to Buckingham, of the 8th of June, 1617, he says, "This day I have made even with the business of the kingdom for common justice; not one cause unheard; the lawyers drawn dry of all the motions they were to make; not one petition unanswered. And this, I think, could not be said in our age before. This I speak, not out of ostentation, but out of gladness, when I have done my duty. I know men think I cannot continue if I should thus oppress myself with business: but that account is made. The duties of life are more than life; and if I die now, I shall die before the world be weary of me, which in our times is somewhat rare." And in two other letters he, from the same cause, expresses the same joy.
These exertions did not secure him from the interference of Buckingham, or protect him, as they have never protected judge, from misrepresentation and calumny; but, unmoved by friendship or by slander, he went right onward in his course. He acted as he taught, from the conviction, that "a popular judge is a deformed thing: and plaudits are fitter for players than magistrates. Do good to the people, love them, and give them justice, but let it be 'nihil inde expectantes;' looking for nothing, neither praise nor profit."
Notwithstanding Bacon's warning to Buckingham, that he ought not, as a statesman, to interfere, either by word or letter, in any cause depending, or like to be depending in any court of justice, the temptations to Buckingham were, it seems, too powerful to induce him to attend to this admonition, in resistance of a custom so long established and so deeply seated, that the applications were, as a matter of course, made to statesmen and to judges, by the most respectable members of the community, and by the two universities.
Early in March, Sir Francis was appointed lord keeper, and, on the 4th of April, Buckingham thus wrote: "My honourable lord:—Whereas the late lord chancellor thought it fit to dismiss out of the chancery a cause touching Henry Skipwith to the common law, where he desireth it should be decided; these are to entreat your lordship in the gentleman's favour, that if the adverse party shall attempt to bring it now back
