CHAPTER XII.
Of the Understanding of Man.
The understanding of man does so surpass that of brutes, that some are of opinion brutes are mere machines, without any manner of perception at all. But letting this opinion alone as ill-grounded, we will proceed to the consideration of human understanding, and the distinct operations thereof.
The lowest degree of it consists in perception, which we have before in part taken notice of, in our discourse of the senses. Concerning which it may be convenient farther to observe, that, to conceive a right notion of perception, we must consider the distinct objects of it, which are simple ideas; v. g. such as are those signified by these words, scarlet, blue, sweet, bitter, heat, cold, &c. from the other objects of our senses; to which we may add the internal operations of our minds, as the objects of our own reflection, such as are thinking, willing, &c.
Out of these simple ideas are made, by putting them together, several compounded or complex ideas; as those signified by the words pebble, marygold, horse.
The next thing the understanding doth in its progress to knowledge, is to abstract its ideas, by which abstraction they are made general.
A general idea is an idea in the mind, considered there as separated from time and place; and so capable to represent any particular being that is conformable to it. Knowledge, which is the highest degree of the speculative faculties, consists in the perception of the truth of affirmative or negative propositions.
This perception is either immediate or mediate. Immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is, when, by comparing them together in our minds, we see, or, as it were, behold, their agreement or disagreement. This, therefore, is
