reputed, and submitted to, as the actions of the prince: but, as a king of England is supposed to be guided, in matters of such importance, by the advice of those he employs in his councils; whenever a parliament thinks fit to complain of such proceedings, as a publick grievance, then this maxim takes place, that the prince can do no wrong, and the advisers are called to account. But shall this empower such an individual as Mr. Steele, in his tatling or pamphleteering capacity, to fix "the ordinary rules of government," or to affirm that her ministers, upon the security of her majesty's goodness, are labouring for the grandeur of France?" What ordinary rule of government is transgressed by the queen's delaying the demolition of Dunkirk? or what addition is thereby made to the grandeur of France? Every tailor in your corporation is as much a fellow subject as Mr. Steele: and do you think, in your conscience, that every tailor of Stockbridge is fit to direct her majesty and her ministers in "the sublime aflairs of her government?"
But he persists in it, "that it is no manner of diminution of the wisdom of a prince, that he is obliged to act by the information of others." The sense is admirable; and the interpretation is this, that what a man is forced to "is no diminution of his wisdom." But, if he would conclude from this sage maxim, that, because a prince "acts by the information of others," therefore those actions may lawfully be traduced in print by every fellow subject; I hope there is no man in England so much a whig as to be of his opinion.
Mr. Steele concludes his letter to you, with a story
