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in the same sense, that is, of the man's mishpachah, or family, a patre uno descendentes; and, therefore, that verse predicates nothing at all of the wife or her relations, near or remote; and, consequently, from these words nothing can be inferred concerning a wife's sister.
Only one objection more remains; it is thus stated: "They who use Lev. xviii. 18, believing that it gives sanction to these marriages, are bound to sanction polygamy. It is not possible for any man to draw a conclusion in favour of marriage with a wife's sister after her decease, without being open to the reply that it precisely, and to the same extent, justifies polygamy, with the exception of the case of marrying the wife's sister."
This reasoning might have been excellent before the coming of the Saviour. But Christ, the Lawgiver, is come, and has taught us that polygamy is contrary to the original purpose of the Creator, and thereby overruled the decision from the old law. He has done the same with regard to divorce; and if it could be shown that He had also modified or abrogated the old permission to marry a deceased wife's sister, the argument from Lev. xviii. 18 would be at an end. No Christian would think of appealing from the Law of Christ to the Law of Moses. But as Christ has forbidden one part of what is sanctioned by Lev. xviii. 18, and not forbidden the other part, I infer that that other is by the law of Christ allowed. To argue that be- cause we take one part of Lev. xviii. 18, which Christ has not forbidden, we are also bound to take the other part of Lev. xviii. 18, which Christ has forbidden, is a strange argument indeed; just as conclusive as that of those who say that, if you take the prohibitions in Lev. xviii. as moral and binding, you must also take the punishments in Lev. xx., and put to death all transgressors. But this sort of argument, a particulari ad universale, is confessedly invalid.
