to the absence of a sufficient number of qualified leaders, but never to a lack of military spirit or of soldierly qualities in the troops themselves.
The Militia of the United Kingdom, raised by voluntary enlistment, with the ballot in reserve in case of national emergency, has been frequently embodied, but has never, except on two minor occasions, taken any direct or leading part as distinct military units in any war until the late South African campaign. The Militia contributed largely to the Peninsular Army; and it was stated by Mr. Sidney Herbert in Parliament that at Waterloo, of 18,000 line soldiers, the majority were volunteers from the Militia. If in the recent campaign the Militia, taken generally, did not realize the expectations formed of its value, the reasons are that the force has for years received little encouragement, has had few advantages as regards training and instruction, and has been consistently emasculated by the annual transfer of officers and men to those regular battalions to which it is affiliated. It would be unreasonable to expect a high degree of fighting value from a force thus sorely tried.
It is beyond all question that the Colonial Militia from Australia and Canada contributed largely to the success of the campaign in South Africa. The excellent service rendered by the Royal Canadian Infantry Regiment at Paardeberg will always be a well-remembered feature of Kronje's surrender; while mounted corps from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, did excellent service, and are conspicuous examples of what Militia troops can do. The later irregular corps were not Militia; and, suffering from the disadvantage of inadequately trained officers, insufficient previous military knowledge, and defective organization, they in many instances left much to be desired. It is safe to assume that the defects revealed will be largely removed by the improved methods of instruction, and by the defined organization now adopted in both Australia and Canada.
