but to court disaster and national disgrace to engage an European army of equal numbers with troops so ill organized, with men so untrained, and with officers so inexperienced as those which composed the majority of those hastily-raised corps during the recent war in South Africa. Men in a mass are much what an organization makes them. The National Militia Armies here advocated provide at least a framework capable of almost indefinite expansion and a complete military organization; it will enable the training of the requisite officers and non-commissioned officers to be effected, the administrative departments to be created, and the stores, guns, and equipment to be purchased. Thus might be gradually evolved at small cost and with slight dislocation of existing institutions a military force which will prove a bond of Unity more consistent with our national sentiments and more universally acceptable than any bond of Commercial Unity, however sound and however plausible.
The writer is deeply conscious of his inability to do full justice to the value and power possessed by a National Militia Army thus organized. He has, however, endeavoured to set before the reader the result of his personal knowledge of, and experience in, the organization and command in peace and war of the Militia of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, extending over a lengthened period of service. It is only by an intimate and personal acquaintance with the excellent military qualities possessed by such troops that their real value as a reliable and fighting element can be correctly gauged. The writer will always look back with pride, pleasure, and profit to his association with the Militia troops of the Empire, and is absolutely convinced that a National Militia Army, with a complete and homogeneous organization, with improved training, and with effective arms and equipment, will prove, when the time of trial comes, not unworthy of the best traditions of the British Army.
