not necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts, and leads to no action.
P. 10, l. 34. i.e. the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
P. 11, l. 11. i.e. without the capability of addition.
P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief Good. See Book X. chap. ii. δῆλον ὡς οὐδ’ἄλλο οὐδὲν τάγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται.
P. 12, l. 9. i.e. as working or as quiescent.
P. 13, l. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses. “Fire burns,” is an instance of the former; “Treason is odious,” of the latter.
P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worth while to vary the interpretation of this word, because though "habitus" may be equivalent to all the senses of ἕξις, “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage: we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.
P. 14, 1. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage is to apply καλῶν κἀγαθῶν to things, and let them depend grammatically on ἐπήβολοι. It is to be remembered, however, that καλός κἀγαθὸς bore a special and well—known meaning: also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems more completely brought out.
P. 15, l. 16. “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii.) Aristotle describes pleasure in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure continually result.
P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact, that external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness: not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in fact, the other side of βίος τέλειος.
P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish.
