P. 160, l. 2.
ὅρον. Aristotle's own account of this word (Prior Analyt. ii. I) is εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις; but both in the account of νοῦς and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.
P. 161. l. 16. The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse: the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας.
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I. chap. v. sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4. Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on ὀργὴ in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler's Sermon on Resentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is Subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects or wrath,[1]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
.·. Actions of Lust are more unjust.
P. 168, l. 3.
τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes ἀκρατὴς for ἀκόλαστος removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων: but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS. and old editions is all on this side.
I understand μᾶλλον as meant to modify the word μαλακίας, which properly denotes that phase of ἀκρασία. (not ἀκολασία) which is caused by pain.
The ἀκόλαστος deliberately pursues pleasure and declines pain: if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under μαλακία more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of μαλακία and ἀκολασία may be fitly given respectively.
P. 169, l. 29. “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair.
- ↑ ὕβρις is introduced as the single instance from which this premise is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.
