to say we choose is not an appropriate term, because, in short, the province of Moral Choice seems to be those things which are in our own power.
Neither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to be unlimited in its range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal and impossible as on those which are in our own power: again, Opinion is logically divided into true and false, not into good and bad as Moral Choice is.
1112a However, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinion simply; but it is not the same with opinion of any kind,[1] because by choosing good and bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by having opinions on them we are not.
Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take or avoid.
Further, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object than for being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance with truth.
Again, we choose such things as we pretty well know to be good, but we form opinions respecting such as we do not know at all.
And it is not thought that choosing and opining best always go together, but that some opine the better course and yet by reason of viciousness choose not the things which they should.
It may be urged, that Opinion always precedes or accompanies Moral Choice; be it so, this makes no difference, for this is not the point in question, but whether Moral Choice is the same as Opinion of a certain kind.
Since then it is none of the aforementioned things, what is it, or how is it characterised? Voluntary it plainly is, but not all voluntary action is an object of Moral Choice. May we not say then, it is “that voluntary which has passed through a stage of previous deliberation?” because Moral Choice is attended with reasoning and intellectual process.
- ↑ i.e. on objects of Moral Choice; opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character: opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.
“Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”
