And the object of search is sometimes the necessary instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and similarly in the rest sometimes through what, and sometimes how or through what.[1]
So it seems, as has been said, that Man is the originator of his actions; and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done through one's own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to other things; and so it is, not the End, but the Means to Ends on which Deliberation is employed.
Nor, again, is it employed on matters of detail, as whether the substance before me is bread, or has been properly 1113a cooked; for these come under the province of sense, and if a man is to be always deliberating, he may go on ad infinitum.
Further, exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation and Moral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is thenceforward separated off and definite,[2] because by object of Moral Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been preferred to something else: for each man leaves off searching how he shall do a thing when he has brought the origination up to himself, i.e. to the governing principle in himself, because it is this which makes the choice.[3] A good illustration of this is furnished by the old regal constitutions which Homer drew from, in which the Kings would announce to the commonalty what they had determined before.
Now since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our own power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the Will, Moral Choice must be “a grasping after something in our own power consequent upon Deliberation:” because after having deliberated we decide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our deliberation.[4]
Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral Choice, that object being “Means to Ends.”
IV
That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been
- ↑ The introduction of the words διὰ τίνος seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter ἐν τίνι added to περὶ τί. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.
- ↑ Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in its nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office: the one chosen is the successful candidate; so of the three βουλευτὰ, the one chosen is the βουλευτὸν προαιρετὸν.
- ↑ Compare Bishop Butler's “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons.
- ↑ These Words, ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι——βούλευσιν, contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation. for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object—matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind: the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected; the two last constitute προαίρεσις in its full meaning. The word ορεξις means literally “a grasping at or after:” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act: consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, βούλησις, or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (i. 10), where ορεξις is divided into αλογος and λογιστική.
The illustration then afforded by the politics alluded to is this: as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move τὰ ὀργανικἀ μέρη. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter: safe arrival at land is naturally desired; two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods: the question being debated, the former is chosen; this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting; but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the agent never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are in his power and deliberation therefore is useless; consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
