Page:The founding of South Australia.djvu/109

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IMPERIUM IN IMFEEIO.
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which I have adverted, would have been such a proposal on the part of the provisional committee as Mr. Stanley would have felt himself justified in assenting to; but he regrets to perceive that the more matured plan which has been brought under his consideration in the shape of 'the proposed charter for the South Australian Commission' is very widely different from that which he was inclined to sanction. Mr. Stanley perceives that the parties who bring forward this plan and who stipulate for the withdrawal from the power of the Crown of the whole of a large territory, are not prepared to insure the application of more than a very small amount of capital to the purchaser of any part of this territory, so small, indeed, as not to hold out a sufficient guarantee for their experiment being effectually set on foot. He perceives also that as the proposed charter is framed, the whole active legislative power over the colony is to be taken from the Crown, and is to be placed in the hands of commissioners, not (except in the first instance) selected by the Crown; not removable except for positive misconduct or neglect; not responsible either to the colonists or to the Government at home for the measures which they may propose, and not personally interested in the success of the undertaking which they are to conduct.

"On the other hand, the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, who will be unable to carry into effect any measure whatever, however essential he may consider it to the welfare of the colony, will still have the task of checking and controlling the proceedings of the new legislative body, and will therefore be subject to the responsibility of the failure of the experiment without being able to contribute to its success.

"Unless this important feature of the proposed charter is abandoned, unless the government of the colony is to be left in the hands of the Crown and its constitutional advisers, until it is able to govern itself—unless, in fact, the provisional committee of the