instead of the old English principle of delegated authority. In that case no charter is required, and there is an end of the question.
"IX. But the Colonial Office cannot find the money. Parliament grumbles at paying £7,000 a year for the Swan River, and would not give anything for another such colony. The Colonial Office is ready to expend the money, but somebody else must find it.
"Answer. This is the very pith of the question. The Colonial Office wants the patronage; but there can be no patronage without money, nor any money without a charter. None will lend their names for raising the money, unless they have a control over the money raised on their responsibility. So that when the Colonial Minister insists on expending the money, he declares in effect that there shall be no money to expend.
"X. The Colonial Minister wishes, on the contrary, that the money should be raised. He wants not the money but the appointments.
"Answer. That is to say, the corporation is to take all the trouble and responsibility of the undertaking, while its servants, on whose conduct and character the success of the undertaking will depend, are to be chosen by the Colonial Minister or his successor, or the successor of his successor. Or rather this money-finding and responsible corporation is not to have any servants of its own; it must find the money, and have the blame of failure, but must not control the work. Such a proposition, surely, was never made before. The Colonial Minister wants a chartered colony as to the money, the trouble, and the responsibility, but a Crown colony as to the patronage. The two opposite principles of control and delegated authority can never be so united. In either case, the appointment of servants necessarily goes along with the money, the trouble, and the responsibility.
