220 TIIK PREDICAMENT INCURRED CHAP, were of no avail. In the roadstead and all its ^" creeks the Russian wa.s master. Nor oi' this was there ever much question, for in judging the limits to which the Allied fleets could push their dominion, tlui invaders and the invaded were of one mind. TheRus- Two other conclusions may be mentioned in siiins now i-iii ii- in- secure on ■vlucli the contcuduig belligerents wei'e able to Side; agree. From the time when the Allies were established on the south c(jast, they did not at all hope, and the Russians, on the other liand, did not at all fear, that the North Side of Sebastopol would ever be carried by means of a descent from the ships ; and with fully equal certainty, and on much better grounds, the belligerents knew it to be out of the question for the Allies to attempt to reverse their famous flank march, by moving l)ack any of their forces round the head of the bay to their old bivouac on the Belbec. Our recognition of these three conclusions — not necessarily as sound in themselves, but — as conclusions in which the Allies and the Russians agreed, will help to i)ut in full light some of the most trying of the conditions which embarrassed the siege of Sebastojxil. For, first, it resulted that, from the time of the flank march, the North Side remained always free of access to the garrison, assuring them their free communication M-ith the interior of liussia, and this without ever absorbing any material portion of their defensive resources. From the moment when it was known that the invading armv had