APPENDIX. 313 NOTES TO CHAPTER VII. Note 1. — Scarce exceeding, he thought, 150. — After seeing the statement of losses in text and footnote (p. 195), and making large allowance for the number of those who may have moved off with wounded men, one may understand how it could have become possible that this rough estimate was not far from the truth. Note 2. — A grape-shot striking his forehead. — Observers at first all imagined that a grape-shot wound in the head which hurled down the general, and deluged him with blood, must almost of course be fatal ; but it proved to be otherwise, and the veteran before long was again at the side of Lord Raglan. Note 3. — By a wisely designed cannonade. — This is substan- tially a negative assertion ; but is still, I think, warranted, be- cause M. Rousset, who had access to all papers of the French War Department, and used them with great care and skill, has remained unacquainted with what in the text are called ' the ' governing facts.' Note 4. — Only some 2000 strong. — General Todleben stated that the English led by General Eyre had been defeated ; but what mainly seems to have brought him to a conclusion so far from the truth was an erroneous impression with respect to the object of the attack. He wrongly imagined that the object of General Eyre was to seize the Peressip batteries, and built on that idea a conclusion that the non-seizure of those batteries im- plied a defeat of the assailing force. Note 5. — These engagements of the Sth of June. — The English Commander-in-chief addressed to Lady Raglan a letter containing these words : — ' Before Sebastopol, June 19, 1855. ' Yesterday we attacked a Russian work called a Redan, and ' the French attacked the works right and left of a tower called ' Malakoff; the object of both attacks being to possess ourselves ' of the Faubourg of Sebastopol. We had apparently subdued ' by the superiority of our fire the Russian artillery, and though ' the attacks could not be considered otherwise than formidable ' enterprises, yet the confidence of success was general, and I con- ' fess that I participated in that confidence. ' It had been determined that the attack should be made at five s or half-past live in the morning, and that the interval between
