the Allies. 8 THE PROBLEM IN HAND. CHAP, a mighty exertion of power; and, on the other . hand, it would seem that in the whole of the Russians. Crimea, exclusive of its Kertchine Peninsula, where 9000 troops were assembled, the enemy could now only reckon some 80,000 infantry, with 12,000 cavalry, and 214 pieces of field artillery.* IV. The j.rob- So, if only the Allies at this time had been free I* m to be . , -i • i -,i i • • solved by trom the knot which still tied them to their siege of Sebastopol, they would seemingly have been able at once to reinvade the Crimea, to fasten upon it in strength from east to west, and with ease, or comparative ease, to reduce a fortress so weak on its northern front as to be there almost powerless against them, whilst lying besides at their mercy, because altogether cut off (by the supposed reinvasion) from its vital communica- tions with Russia by either the land or the sea. But no such freedom belonged to the powerful yet fettered Allies. They had not yet expiated the fault of sitting down as besiegers before the south front of Sebastopol. Irresistible reasons, we know, forbade them all thought of enduring that their siege-works or their ports of supply should fall into the enemy's hands.! Yet, fitly to guard these possessions was a task, as we saw, ascertained to require 90,000 men, of whom all were perforce to be French, or French and Eng-
- Todleben, vol. ii. p. 258.
t As shown ante, vol. viii. p. 2S4.
