PRECEDING THE INVASION. 105 only one division each at Yarna would be, that chap. they would not get entangled prematurely in ^^^' hostile operations ; for with such a small force no one could taunt the "Western Powei-s for not marching to relieve Silistria, or for not rrivin" battle to the liussians ; whereas, argued the Mar- shal, if the Allies were present in greater strength, it was to be feared that they might suffer them- selves to be carried away by the Turks. ' It is ' important,' said the ^Marshal, ' not to give battle ' to the Eussians, except with all possible chances ' of success, and the certainty of obtaining great ' results.' Then, after describing the supposed ad- vantages of his intended position in rear of the l^alkan, the Marshal reverted to his dread of beintr carried forward by the warlike Turks. ' We must ' not,' said he, ' lose sight of this ; that we are ' here to aid the Turks — to succour them, to save ' them — but not by following their plans and their
- ideas. It is evident that Omar Pasha lias no
' other idea, but that of drawing on the allied ' army to give battle to the Paissians, and to re- ' lieve Silistria. The safety of Turkey is not in ' Silistria ; and it is necessary to aid and succour ' the Turks in our own way.' No one perhaps will now defend a plan of cam- paign which was to place the allied armies of the Western Powers in a position some hundreds of miles from the scene of any conflict, and to with- draw them from the very proximity of the Otto- man generalissimo for fear of his warlike counsels. Still, such justice as is due must be rendered to
