OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 219 Besides, it must be borne in mind, that wlien chap. XllI an English Government luidertakes to wage war . L_ in a country beyond the seas without doing all it ["'EngUiuT can to get soldierly aid from the natives, it does auxiliaifea. not merely neglect a slight or collateral advantage ; on the contrary, it throws away its power of act- ing with efficient numbers, and is in danger of frittering away the nation'^ strength upon those (often ill-fated) schemes which go by the name of ' expeditions.' Without our Portuguese auxil- iaries there would have been no great Peninsular War, no successful invasion of France ; without the native soldiery of Iliudostan there would have been no British India ; without the German auxiliaries who served under Wellington in his last campaign, he could not have given battle to Napoleon in the Netlierlands, and the course of English history would not have run as it did. The truth is, that (especially at the beginning of a war) any body of English troops which our Government brings together at one time and one l^lace is in general so costly, and of so high a quality, but also so scant in numbers, that to use it, and use it singly, for all the work of the cam- paign, is to consume and squander the precious essence of the nation's strength without making it the means of attaining any worthy result. Therefore, whenever it is possible, a British force serving abroad and engaged in an arduous campaign, ought to have on its side, not mere allies — for that is but a doubtful, and often a poor support to have to lean upon — but auxiliaries
