272 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS CHAP, which must be explained. He believed that the '_ enterprise was one of a very hazardous kind, and was not warranted by any safe information con- cerning the state of the enemy's forces. Having that conviction, why did he not feel bound to assert it, notwithstanding the urgency of the Home Government ? Lord Eaglan was, as might be supposed, deeply imbued with reverence for TiioRiounds the authority of the Duke of Wellington; and, on wUieh it ... . , , , . . . ' rested. rightly interpreted, that authority is surely the safest guide that an English general can follow. But there is a certain danger in the precepts of the Great Duke, unless when they are construed down to their right degree of significance by applying to them the splendid context of his deeds ; for he was accustomed to use sayings founded on quaint and very literal readings of our English law ; and the loyalty of his nature rose so high above the reach of all cavil, that the maxims which he uttered seemed to give a noble simplicity to the tenor of his public life, though in reality he rarely or never permitted them to derange his policy, still less to confuse him in the management of war. Naturally, therefore, men were in danger of being misled by a too narrow harbour, for one instant, the notion .subniittcd to liini by Sir George P)rovii — the notion of engaging liis army in an impru- dent undertaking from an apprehension of linding himself superseded in the command by some one less scrupulous and more ready to come in to the plans of the Government. Lord Raglan, after this conference, was, I think, less inclined than before to single out Sir George Brown as the one man with whom to consult upon affairs of great moment.
