ing for another, and very few voting for all, they cannot be regarded as a unit, embodying conditions of compact, or compromise, if you please, adopted equally by all parties, and, therefore, obligatory on all parties. But since this broken series of measures has been adduced as an apology for the proposition now before us, I desire to say, that, such as they are, they cannot, by any effort of interpretation, by any distorting wand of power, by any perverse alchemy, be transmuted into a repeal of that original prohibition of slavery.
On this head there are several points to which I would merely call attention, and then pass on. First: The slavery enactments of 1850 did not pretend, in terms, to touch, much less to change, the condition of the Louisiana Territory, which was already fixed by Congressional enactment, but simply acted upon "newly-acquired Territories," the condition of which was not already fixed by Congressional enactment. The two transactions related to different subject-matters. Secondly: The enactments do not directly touch the subject of slavery, during the territorial existence of Utah and New Mexico; but they provide prospectively, that, when admitted as States, they shall be received "with or without slavery." Here certainly can be no overthrow of an act of Congress which directly concerns a Territory during its territorial existence. Thirdly: During all the discussion of these measures in Congress, and afterwards before
