sion, to him who would overthrow this well-established landmark. He is, indeed, no Abolitionist of Slavery; let him be called, Sir, an Abolitionist of Freedom. For myself, whether with many or few, my place is taken. Even if alone, my feeble arm should not be wanting as a bar against this outrage.
On two distinct grounds, "both strong against the deed," I arraign it: First, in the name of Public Faith, as an infraction of solemn obligations assumed beyond recall by the South on the admission of Missouri into the Union as a Slave State; Secondly, I arraign it in the name of Freedom, as an unjustifiable departure from the original anti-slavery policy of our fathers. These two heads I propose to consider in their order, glancing under the latter at the objections to the prohibition of slavery in the Territories.
And here, Sir, before I approach the argument, indulge me with a few preliminary words on the character of this proposition. Slavery is the forcible subjection of one human being, in person, labor, and property, to the will of another. In this simple statement is involved its whole injustice. There is no offence against religion, against morals, against humanity, which may not, in the license of this institution, stalk "unwhipt of justice." For the husband and wife there is no marriage; for the mother there is no assurance that her infant child will not be ravished from her breast; for all who bear the
