though these seem of little validity, yet I would not pass them in silence.
The prohibition of slavery in the Territories is assailed, as beyond the power of Congress, and an infringement of the local sovereignty. On this account it is, at this late day, pronounced unconstitutional. Now, without considering minutely the sources from which the power of Congress over the national domain is derived—whether from the express grant in the Constitution to make rules and regulations for the government of the territory, or from the power necessarily implied to govern territory acquired by conquest or purchase; it seems to me impossible to deny its existence, without invalidating a large portion of the legislation of the country, from the adoption of the Constitution down to the present day. This power was asserted before the Constitution. It was not denied or prohibited by the Constitution itself. It has been exercised from the first existence of the Government, and has been recognized by the three Departments—the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial. Precedents of every kind are thick in its support. Indeed, the very bill now before us, assumes a control of the territory clearly inconsistent with those principles of sovereignty, which are said to be violated by a Congressional prohibition of slavery.
Here are provisions, determining the main features in the Government—the distribution of powers
