arms and the motto of the Princes of Wales that were taken from King John of Bohemia at the battle of Crécy. This and especially the fact that there had existed mutual relations—political, religious and educational—between Bohemia and England, had a beneficent influence. But, as I had accepted the Professorship at London University, I had to think of my lectures as well as of propaganda. At the time I thought this a bothersome interruption though to-day I understand that Seton-Watson and Dr. Burrows advised me well when they urged me so insistently to accept the appointment.
The Military Outlook.
As was natural, I heard much in London of the English army and of the situation on the various fronts. Indeed, I had now a chance to consult English and French experts on all military questions. I have repeatedly said that I had been worried by the problem of the war’s duration. As late as the spring of 1915, taking account of every military opinion, I admitted at times that the war would be over by the end of the year. Yet the situation in the field foreshadowed a protracted struggle. The war of position dragged on. It enabled the belligerents to raise forces at home, to equip and train fresh divisions and reserves, and to adapt industry to war purposes. People talked of the growing part that aircraft and submarines would play. To judge by the news, it seemed unlikely that the Allies would make peace without some big success at the front, even though influential people on both sides were working for peace. The victory on the Marne had not been decisive. True, there was some nervousness in Germany, at least among the Socialists, as was shown by the debate on peace terms in the Reichstag and by the attitude of Schiedemann at the beginning of December 1915. Everything I could learn from sound soldiers in all the armies, and occasionally from prisoners, led me to believe that the military operations would last long—a view which political considerations confirmed. What I heard in London of military plans—and I heard much—was not always pleasant. There were sharp differences of opinion even in responsible quarters, not only about the Dardanelles but also about the French and Russian plans of campaign. It was curious to see soldiers as well as politicians put forward ideas of strategy of which the impossible and fantastic character was clear even to laymen. Colonel Repington’s articles in “The Times” showed distrust of British and Allied leadership
