army during the following autumn. Lloyd George also believed in the necessity of raising very considerably the strength of all the Allied armies if the German front was to be broken through.
Indeed, on all fronts the situation was getting unpleasant and increasingly complicated. Everywhere there was lively disappointment with Russia. In October 1915 Bulgaria joined the enemy, the conduct of negotiations with her being criticized in London, where the failure to win her over to the Allied side was thought a serious diplomatic reverse. Simultaneously a new Allied centre was established at Salonica—after a long discussion which ended in the acceptance of the plan by England and France, thanks to the influence of Briand. The fighting, which began in November 1915 between the Bulgars and the Allied forces under General Sarrail, turned out badly, while the overthrow of Serbia by Mackensen’s army, and the taking of Belgrade on October 8, made a deep impression of which the depressing effect was, however, neutralized by the heroic conduct of the Serbians in withdrawing the remainder of their army across Albania and in transferring their Government to Corfu. And, while the Turks were victorious in Mesopotamia, bloody and indecisive fighting continued on the Western front, where the Germans stood on the defensive because their main forces were opposing the Russians.
This was the position when I decided to issue our manifesto on November 14, 1915, and to declare open war against Austria. As I have said, the manifesto was signed by our “Committee Abroad” and by representatives of all our colonies. It was issued because of the excitement in our colonies and of their fears lest I fail to take a public stand, but especially in order to prevent our people at home from being tempted to give way. I was afraid, too, that the defeat of Russia might have an unfortunate effect at home and lead to reprisals; and I had received in advance the assent of our secret circle of public men, known as the “Maffia,” which had approved of the general lines of the manifesto.
In view of the unfavourable situation, I hardly expected the manifesto to make much impression on the Allies. Yet its effect was considerable. In the French press it was widely reproduced; M. Gauvain wrote upon it a leading article in the “Journal des Débats”; and there was considerable comment in the English papers. At that moment we were better known in France than in England. Soon, however, people in England got to know us better, beginning with
