Committee. They, especially the Croats and Slovenes, made their political headquarters in the English capital. Among them were Supilo, Hinkovitch, Vosnyak, Potochnyak and Mestrovitch, the sculptor. The Serbian Minister was M. Jovanovitch, whom I had known in Vienna, and until he came the Legation was in charge of M. Antonievitch, whom I also knew well. Professors Savitch and Popovitch, and Father Nicolai Velimirovitch, who carried on skilful ecclesiastical propaganda, were prominent among the Serbs; and when, in April 1916, the Serbian Crown Prince arrived with the Prime Minister, Pashitch, I had conversations and entered into friendly agreements with both.
In view of the Treaty of London, relations with Italy always formed a delicate point, not only for the Southern Slavs but for me too; and, as I was working steadily in concert with them, the Italo-Yugoslav problem was always with me. My former championship of the Yugoslav cause on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1891–98, in the Agram and Friedjung trials of 1909 and in the struggle against Aehrenthal and in the Vashitch trial at Belgrade—gave me an exceptional position among them. In the present case, their conflict with Italy became especially acute because the Italians in London were diligent in defending the Treaty. My opinion was that Italy would give way in the final peace negotiations. She could not have taken part in the war without some recompense, and the question was whether we did not all need her help to ensure an Allied victory. What if the Austrians and Germans should win? In that event the situation would have been very much worse for the Yugoslavs also, and for a very long time. With insignificant exceptions, our Yugoslav friends were sharply antagonistic to Italy, though some of them held more moderate views and kept in touch with the Italians—which was tactically advantageous. The official Serbian attitude was calm, but it had the effect of exciting distrust among the Croats and Slovenes who often complained that, like Russia, Serbia was betraying the Yugoslavs and Slav interests in general. Our views differed from those of the Croats and Slovenes on yet another feature of the London Treaty—the provision by which the Allies, in deference to Italian wishes, undertook to exclude the Vatican from the Peace Conference.
To us, the relationship to Italy was important for an additional reason. In fighting against Austria, the Italians soon made prisoners of a large number of our men and, as in Russia,
