and therefore they hatched a plan to get rid of the Tsar, in the worst event, as the Emperor Paul was got rid of. Extremes of this kind are always the last resort of passive folk unable to overcome evil by systematic work. I learned of the plot for a Palace revolution from several trustworthy quarters, and the news of it has since leaked out, here and there, in the press.
My chief task was, however, to reconnoitre the military and political situation. Clearly, I could reach no other conclusion than that which I stated in “The Times.” To such a Russia neither we nor the Allies could look for help. The decisive cause of disaster in the field had been the moral depravity of the upper classes of Russian society and of no small part of the whole Russian people. The trial of Masoyedoff (who had been in touch with Rasputin and was hanged in March 1915) and that of Sukhomlinoff (who was arrested in May 1916) revealed the demoralization among military leaders. Such trials sufficed to condemn the army administration, even if there were no treason in favour of Germany—though this was widely alleged. To my mind it matters little whether or not a separate peace with Germany was discussed when Protopopoff met Wahrburg in the German Legation at Stockholm during the former’s journey abroad with the members of the Duma. It seems that it was not discussed but, in any case, the meeting was out of place and politically indiscreet. The real guilt of Tsardom seems to me to lie in the fact that it went to war unprepared, rashly and without conscientious consideration even of its own interests; for this reason, after the first defeats, it was driven towards Germany. As early as March 1916 there were reports that Stinnes was seeking an arrangement with Russia; and it was on account of Germany that Stürmer, like his successor, Trepoff, was appointed Prime Minister. No wonder the Allies lost faith in Russia. For a time they even hesitated to provide her with arms and war material lest these be turned against themselves.
Naturally, too, the military insufficiency of Russia compelled the Allies to change their strategy. Distrust of the Russians spread in France because the army they had promised was not sent. Yet, after every reverse, the Russian Command kept the Allies quiet by saying that there were millions and millions of Russian soldiers; and General Alexeieff is stated really to have wished to call up millions of men, without thinking that there would be no means of feeding, arming or managing them. I felt sick when, after the Brusiloff offensive,
