betray the Tsar. It is some excuse for these Russians that, albeit only at first, the same argument was used against us in Italy, England, America and occasionally in France. Only by explaining our position over and over again could we manage to de-Austrianize ourselves. Even Alexeieff must be reckoned to some extent among the Russian Generals and officials who were so steeped in legitimism that they could not sympathize with our Revolution. Our people thought him their best friend. He was; but he could not free himself from his inveterate Russian views.
The legitimist argument took more practical shape in the contention that, if the Czechs were used against Austria, the Germans and the Austrians might use their Russian prisoners against Russia—the very contention which Sonnino adopted on behalf of Italy. It was the less justified in the Russian case because the Germans were already carrying on systematic propaganda for Germany among the Russian prisoners. But the Russian reactionaries who, in their heart of hearts, disliked the Entente and the West, made yet another point against the formation of a big Czech army—it must not be sent to France! In support of this plea they could appeal to some of our own people, for General Červinka did not favour the transfer of our men to France. One very influential reactionary explained to me his dislike of the West by saying that Brusiloff’s offensive in 1916 had brought no gain to Russia though, in the course of it, her troops had taken half a million prisoners and nearly a million guns! In reality, the number of prisoners was about 150,000 and that of the guns proportionately very much lower. He claimed that, under pressure from the Tsar, whom the King of Italy had influenced, Brusiloff had been obliged to strike before he was ready—proof that Russia was not working for the King of Prussia but for the Kings and Presidents in the West!
At last the Revolution gave things a turn for the better. It was fortunate that Milyukoff, whose support for our policy I had secured in England, should have become Foreign Minister. Yielding to the new spirit, General Dukhonin, who was then Quartermaster—General, ordered, on June 18, 1917, that our brigade should be raised to four regiments and that the battalions of the reserve should also be strengthened in view of a further increase. Militarily, also, things grew better after the battle of Zboroff,[1] where our brigade showed both
- ↑ In Eastern Galicia. The battle was fought on July 3, 1917, the heights of Zboroff being gallantly stormed by the Czech and Russian troops.
