the Serbian Minister at Petrograd. Serbia was Orthodox, an independent State, an ally of Russia and was officially represented at Petrograd. Therefore the Russian authorities allowed her forthwith to recruit “Austrian” prisoners, despite the legitimist arguments that were brought forward against us. Several detachments were sent to Serbia as early as 1915. The Serbian General, Živkovitch, was at Odessa, and to him the Austrian-Serb officers and non-commissioned officers were despatched. Thus the first Serbian division in Russia was formed in 1916. Many of our officers and men, tired of waiting for a Czech army, joined it, the Serbians promising to organize a special Czech contingent; but Kieff opposed the scheme and it was dropped. Consequently, a number of our men left the Serbian division. Sad was the fate of those who remained in it, and of the Division itself. Strategically, its gallant struggle in the Dobrudja against Mackensen’s advance was bootless, yet it strengthened the ties between us and the Serbs and enhanced the closeness of our cooperation. I need not tell how the formation of a second Serbian Division was begun or how dissensions caused it to be disbanded, for I wish only to show the difference between the bearing of official Russia towards the Serbians and towards us. But I remember with gratitude our officers and men who gave their lives on the Dobrudja plains for Serbia and for our common freedom. In April 1917 the Serbian command released our men, who returned to join our own army at Kieff.
Our treatment by the Russian authorities reminds me of a story that is told of the Commander of an Austrian fortress who once gave the Emperor Francis Joseph a hundred reasons why a salute had not been fired in honour of his Majesty’s arrival, the final reason being that there was no powder. In dealing with me, the Russian military officials were in an analogous position. They gave me all sorts of explanations, reasons and excuses which I have faithfully set forth; but they did not tell me what I learned only after the Bolshevist Revolution—that, from 1915 onwards, the supreme military and political authorities had definitely decided not to create a Czech army. The Serbian military attaché, Lontkevitch, told me of this decision and promised to send me, to Paris or America, copies of the official minutes recording it. Unfortunately, he died; and, if he sent them, I never received them.
In the light of this information, I understood that Russian soldiers, trained in obedience, should have felt themselves bound by the decision and by official secrecy in regard to it;
