started only in November 1917, and its numbers were much smaller than we anticipated. At that time we hoped, however, that before long we should all be able to get to France by way of Siberia.
The prospect of service in France naturally affected the organization of our troops. To make things easier, we introduced French discipline and appointed French liaison officers. My whole care was to keep the army together and to prevent it from being drawn into the Russian military chaos. In this I succeeded to some extent, thanks to the collapse of the Russian army and to the demoralization of the country. The collapse taught our men a lesson; and, on the other hand, it helped us to get, from the Russian military magazines, material that would otherwise have been merely looted. We had to take what we wanted, for it was out of the question to make arrangements with the authorities, so great was the prevailing uncertainty and so rapidly did the authorities change. No sooner had I settled something with Korniloff than, on the morrow, Brusiloff was in his place. In short, there was utter confusion.
The official permission to form an army was merely a framework. Details had to be filled in and, particularly, the final dimensions of our force had still to be determined. At first I asked only for one Corps, to which a second could be added according to circumstances. General Dukhonin, the new Chief of General Staff at Headquarters, made me this important concession on October 9, 1917. Unlike Brusiloff, Korniloff and Alexeieff, Dukhonin, who knew and appreciated our lads, their work as scouts and their gallantry at Zboroff, had the pluck to set aside the obsolete decision of the Tsarist Government. Thus we got our Corps which, by definite agreement, was to be independent of the Russians. Furthermore, it was expressly stipulated with Dukhonin that it should only take action against the foreign enemy—an acceptance and confirmation by the Russians themselves of my main principle of neutrality in regard to Russian internal affairs. This safeguarded us against the danger of being dragged into Russian party quarrels, to-day on one side, to-morrow on another; and it reassured the Conservatives and Reactionaries in the Russian army who feared and resisted to the last the establishment of an independent Czech force.
Dukhonin was a young, vigorous and capable officer and a very honourable man. He understood our position and helped us. He withstood Lenin’s orders to conclude an Armistice with the Central Powers. Unhappily, he was killed by the
