From what I saw and heard I concluded that our army could not go to the Roumanian front. Commissariat difficulties were, I thought, already so great that it was doubtful whether Roumania could provide for an increase of 50,000 men; and, above all, I felt that Roumania would not be able to prolong her resistance. The troops and the officers made a very good impression and, as I have said, their spirit was excellent. The French officers in the Roumanian army did their work most honourably, but the situation as a whole seemed to be drifting towards peace, and it struck me that the Russian forces in Roumania were no longer trustworthy. It was clear that Bolshevist Russia would soon make peace with Germany. How would Roumania then be able to hold out? And what should we do on Roumanian soil when peace had been made? Events soon bore out my decision. News of the Caporetto disaster, which reached Jassy while I was there, only confirmed my estimate of the Roumanian position. In fact, the Roumanian peace negotiations began soon after those of Russia—armistice negotiations on December 9, 1917, provisional peace on March 5, 1918, definite peace on May 7. The comparison between Roumania, the Ukraine and Russia is interesting. With the two latter, negotiations went more quickly, whereas the Roumanian negotiations lasted six months.
People in Paris were dissatisfied with my decision. They could not judge accurately at that distance, though they soon saw that I was right. Politically, moreover, my stay at Jassy bore good fruit. Our personal acquaintance and cooperation with the Roumanians in Russia were the germ of the Little Entente. When Roumania decided to make war, Beneš, Štefánik and I had sent Bratianu a telegram saying that Roumania was fighting for the liberation of our people; and, after the war, our common interests brought us together. The same is true of the Southern Slavs though, at that time, the ideas of the Serbians and Roumanians were not clear enough about the delimitation of the Banat. I discussed this matter with both parties and advised them to seek a peaceful agreement.
Why we were Neutral in Russia.
Our rule in Bolshevist Russia, as well as in the Ukraine and in regard to all new political formations, was to avoid intervention in party disputes and conflicts. Since we were armed neutrals, we had weapons for self-defence in case of need; and, as a part of the French army, we should naturally have used
