dissatisfaction with the leadership of the French army. Changes had again been made in the high command, General Pétain, the opponent of Nivelle’s strategic plan, becoming Commander-in-Chief; while, after the great German offensive in March 1918, General Foch had been placed in command of the Allied armies on the Western front. Unitary leadership had long been necessary. An earlier attempt to secure it had come to nothing, though the Supreme Military Council of the Allies had been set up in November 1917. Now, after the German offensive of March 21, 1918, unity of command was indispensable. The offensive seemed at first so successful that the French thought once more of removing the Government from Paris; but the Germans failed to take Amiens, their chief immediate objective—a failure which convinced them that they or, at least, their strategic plan had not succeeded and that the “great battle” in France was still undecided.
Politically, France was winning. Clemenceau, who became Prime Minister and Minister for War, had established his vigorous rule from November 16, 1917, onwards. The internal situation was characterized by the expulsion of M. Malvy, the former Minister of the Interior, by the arrest of M. Caillaux, the former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, on January 14, 1918, and by the execution of Bolo Pasha on February 5. It should be remembered, however, that the law against defeatism and pacifist propaganda had been passed on June 26, 1917, nearly five months before Clemenceau took office.
After the Caporetto disaster in October 1917 Italy had pulled herself together and had reorganized her army with the help of British and French divisions. Austria had won her victory with German aid; by herself, she was, obviously, no longer equal to her task, strategically or militarily. We know now that the object of the Caporetto offensive was so to crush the Italians that the enemy could cross the Alps into Southern France. I had all along expected an attempt of this sort.
The Peace Treaties which Germany had concluded with her Eastern adversaries, especially with Russia, were an index to the whole military and political situation. To me they seemed likewise to foreshadow peace in the West. In fact, a number of peace feelers were put out by both sides during 1917 and the early months of 1918, principally by the Central Powers. As early as December 1916 Germany and her Allies had made an official offer of peace to the Western Allies; and there were afterwards a whole series of secret offers, how many cannot exactly be said, emanating either from authoritative quarters
