a joint declaration while the Bell of Independence was rung in accordance with historical precedent. The proceedings were thoroughly “American,” but they were sincerely meant and were successful.
The Union was an excellent means of propaganda, with the practical object of giving the public and the press information upon some or all of the peoples belonging to it. Eleven of them were represented at Philadelphia. Our object was also to put before the Americans a concrete idea of the zone of small nations in Central Europe upon the importance of which in the war and, indeed, in European history, I constantly insisted. By getting to know and informing each other reciprocally the representatives of the various peoples were to prepare themselves for the Peace Conference and, if possible, to enter it with a concerted plan. This was the ideal. In reality, there were not a few antagonisms and disagreements as when, for instance, the Poles seceded from the Union, alleging that they could not sit side by side with the Little Russians after the latter had taken action against them in Eastern Galicia, though some of the Poles assured us that this was not the real reason. Despite dissensions, the representatives of the other peoples stayed in the Union. For a time it was feared that the State Department might turn against Professor Miller, some of whose utterances had given offence. But I averted this danger and, even after my departure, the Union worked on for some time.
The Ruthenes.
As I had always reckoned with the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, I had not forgotten the Ruthene, or Little Russian territory in Hungary and what its fate might be when Hungary should collapse. The importance of this region is obvious on account of its proximity to the other Little Russian lands and to territories inhabited by Roumanians, Magyars and Czechoslovaks. Slovak writers, in particular, had long paid keen attention to the Little Russian part of Slovakia. As long as Russia was victorious it was a question whether she would not lay claim to Hungarian Ruthenia, especially as Eastern Galicia had been immediately occupied by Russian forces. At that time, however, Russia had no definite ideas on the subject since she thought that the Magyars might turn against Austria—a singular pro-Magyarism to which I have already referred. The Allies, on the other hand, did not wish the Russians to extend south of the Carpathians. (On this
