and was at heart opposed to Germany. The Emperor Charles himself said this in so many words; and, after Francis Joseph’s death, the circumstance that Charles had not been responsible for the war strengthened his position in France and England. His continual protestations of readiness to make peace gained him Allied sympathies.
German military successes, Russian defeats and, subsequently, the Russian Revolution accentuated the idea of dividing Austria-Hungary from Germany. In 1916 we noticed suddenly that our Russian friend and fellow-worker, Svatkovsky, was harbouring conciliatory views about Austria to a disquieting degree; and, under the influence of the Stürmer régime, he advocated outspokenly an agreement with Austria and, if necessary, even with Germany. Not a few influential French journalists who had previously supported us against Austria thought likewise. Hence I concluded that his view was shared in official circles and I kept my eyes open. The fact that the French Ambassador in Petrograd, M. Paléologue, submitted to Sazonof on January 1, 1915, a detailed scheme (to which I have already referred) shows that the idea of turning Germany against Austria had been fairly widespread in France from the first. In fairness to Paléologue it must be added that he described the scheme as personal, not official. Therefore I treat it only as a symptom. In addition to the old French liking for Austria, and particularly for Vienna, the military tendency came into play—to weaken and vanquish the Germans militarily by means of a separate peace with Austria. The unfavourable military situation of the Allies also played a part. It explains why Briand, who, in February 1916, had accepted our programme which culminated in the destruction of Austria-Hungary, gave ear a year later to the proposals of Prince Sixtus. Nor was Briand alone. A number of important men, such as MM. de Freycinet, Jules and Paul Cambon and William Martin, Chief of the Ceremonial Department of the French Presidency, were of the same mind as Briand and Prince Sixtus, that is to say, the Emperor Charles. The standpoint of the French General Staff and of Foch seems to confirm my view; for, after the failure of General Nivelle’s offensive in the spring of 1917, the General Staff took up the idea seriously. What Clemenceau thought I do not know. When I first came into touch with official Paris, I heard he was unfavourable to us. In America I was told that he had wished to negotiate with Austria in the spring of 1918 and had opened communications with her, apparently through a well-
