1918 and, later on, when the fighting began, Sadoul saw quite clearly that the Bolshevist Government in Moscow misjudged the position and unjustly attributed reactionary tendencies to our army—an accusation that was neither true nor sincerely made, particularly on the part of Trotsky who, in March 1918, was still looking for Allied help against Germany. Sundry local Soviets, and individuals lacking in political judgment, stupidly made matters worse. To our agreement with the Soviets on March 26, 1918, I have referred. In accordance with it Stalin then ordered the local commissary at Penza—in the name of the Moscow Soviet—to grant our men free passage to Vladivostok; but, two days later, on March 28, our men intercepted telegrams from the Omsk Soviet demanding that our troops be disarmed and transported to Archangel. Ultimately Moscow gave way. Our men had loyally assented to the partial disarmament which Moscow had demanded on the plea that their weapons were Russian property. They understood the difficult position of the Moscow authorities after the peace of Brest-Litovsk which bound Russia not to tolerate the existence of armed anti-German forces on Russian soil. But, at the same time, they felt keenly that Moscow was not keeping faith. It was perfidious on the part of the Bolshevists to propose to the Germans, as they did in June 1918, that the German prisoners should be armed against our troops in Siberia; and it must be said that the Germans were more honourable, for they declined the suggestion. On the other hand, it is true that Moscow was influenced by the treacherous conduct of some Czechs who had joined the Bolshevists. In order to counteract biased reports, I sent Tchitcherin towards the end of June an explanatory telegram in this sense which was published in the American and European press. Our campaign in Siberia was not an anti-Bolshevist undertaking nor was it inspired by any interventionist policy. It was forced upon us by the obligation of self-defence. Equally false is it to ascribe to us any, no matter how unintentional, responsibility for the murder of the Tsar and of his family by the Bolshevists at Ekaterinburg on July 16, 1918. The first official report of the murder issued at Moscow stated, for instance, that the local Soviet had ordered the Tsar to be shot lest he escape or be carried off by the Czechoslovaks. The truth is that our troops entered Ekaterinburg only on July 25 and, what is more to the point, they never had the slightest intention of liberating the Tsar. The unfortunate man had been abandoned by his own reactionaries, who had even thought of having him
