with Mr. Lansing about his declaration; and my criticism of it, and interviews with other members of the Government, led to the statement (explanatory of his May declaration) which Lansing issued on June 28. The Serbian Minister, I ought to add, also presented a memorandum to Lansing upon the May declaration. In his explanatory statement Lansing insisted that the previous expression of sympathy with us and with the Southern Slavs signified the desire of the United States for complete liberation of all Slavs from Austrian and German rule. This was a great step forward, really our first big success in America, where official circles, notwithstanding their goodwill towards us, were not a little embarrassed by our problem since there was no international precedent to serve as a guide in solving it.
After our recognition as an Allied and belligerent nation by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, on August 9, we had been granted clearer and more definite recognition in America on September 3. Lansing and I agreed upon it; and, in pursuance of our agreement, I handed him on August 31 a lengthy memorandum setting forth the necessity of our being recognized by the Allies. At that time the negotiations for the relief of our army in Siberia were going on, and Lansing drew up his declaration in this sense, taking Mr. Balfour’s declaration as a model. The American document recognized that a state of war existed between us and the German and Austrian Empires; it acknowledged our National Council as the de facto Czechoslovak Government which was waging regular warfare and had full power to direct the political and military affairs of the Czechoslovak nation. Mr. Lansing kindly showed me the document before it was published. I expressed my gratitude to him and thanked President Wilson in writing for his political high-mindedness, justice and wisdom. Wilson’s answer convinced me of the great change and of the improvement in the views of the White House upon Austria-Hungary.
The fourth and decisive act of recognition came on October 18 in the acceptance of our Declaration of Independence. The subsequent course of events in Austria and in Hungary proved to President Wilson and to other American statesmen that my view of Austrian conditions, and my judgment both of the internal collapse of Austria and Hungary and of the whole course of the war, had been accurate; and this proof impressed them. I myself was more than satisfied that events showed me to have been right. Thus the confidence
