whole strength of the German army. His plan, which was worked out in detail in the eighties of last century, was in accordance with the political situation, for England was then hostile to Russia. Bismarck and General Count Waldersee, who succeeded the elder Moltke as Chief of General Staff, agreed with it. Schlieffen, who succeeded Waldersee in 1891, found it no easy task to withstand Moltke’s authority, though he was disposed to think that the main attack should be directed against France and that Austria should deal with Russia. Under him, the General Staff and the Kaiser decided in this sense; and, according to some accounts, the Emperor William was really the author of Schlieffen’s plan.
But in 1914 the political situation was essentially different. England stood with France and Russia, and Italy and America presently joined the Allies. The balance of forces and their disposition were other than they had been in the time of the elder Moltke. The occupation of Belgium led, moreover, to tactical changes that were not in harmony with Schlieffen’s main postulates. Moltke the younger took over Schlieffen’s plan for the war of 1914 but gave it up after the battle of the Marne and returned to that of his uncle, Moltke the elder. It was then too late, and the change merely shows the perplexity of the German Supreme Command. To some extent the Germans were carrying out the concept of the elder Moltke when they beat the Russians in the East and waged a war of movement, while they fought a war of position in France and were really on the defensive. The French adapted their tactics to their own numerical inferiority, whereas Germany trusted too much to her traditional numerical preponderance; and she failed to change strategy and tactics when the other Allies came into the field alongside of the French. At the moment of the final German offensive in 1918, the Germans possessed numerical superiority or, at least, equality of numbers. Yet they lacked mobility and the gift of improvisation. True, they sprang some surprises in detail upon their enemies, as, for instance, with their long-range guns; and though they had conscientious Generals, they lacked real military leaders. Hence their incapacity for unitary action on a grand scale and their addiction to small sporadic enterprises and partial successes which served only to mislead them. It was always a puzzle to me why they besieged Verdun so violently and obstinately. What might they not have done had they thrown the greater part of their army into Russia when Stürmer was in power in 1916!
