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THE RISE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC
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that Austria was a dam against Germany; and though the war was in itself a refutation of this view, it still prevailed. As I have shown, it was very strong in all Allied and neutral countries, and it was no easy matter to overcome it, the less easy because many of us had long sought to persuade the world that Austria was a necessity. Besides, an intense pro-Austrian propaganda worked against us. Our victory was therefore the more remarkable. The Allies knew less than we about Austria-Hungary, and they were totally unacquainted with the complicated racial and economic conditions in Eastern Europe. Our long experience and study of Eastern Europe enabled us therefore to put forward a positively-conceived policy against Austria and Germany. Indeed, as I have said in referring to my first official interview with Briand, we supplied the Allies with a political programme. This is no exaggeration, as our friends in France, England and America admit. Nor did we give them only our programme. We gave them programmes for the liberation of other peoples and for the reconstruction of Europe as a whole. Of this, proof may be found in my work “The New Europe” which was handed in French and English to all the Allied delegates to the Peace Conferences at the end of the war.

Moreover, in our propaganda and action abroad, we were financially independent of the Allies. We declined even the friendliest offers of assistance. This is one of the reasons why we disavowed the attempt of the Russian Government to create its own paid “Czech National Council.” The only case in which I took an English subsidy was in that of our American Secret Service, as I was entitled to do because it was doing special work exclusively for the Allies. True, we maintained our Legions on credit, but we kept them independent. Though I knew that I was thus mortgaging the Budget of our future State, it seemed to me the only right course.

Several instances of financial dependence which came under my notice strengthened me in this decision. The surprise which it caused some political men in Allied countries proves how weighty it was. They thought we disposed of immense funds, derived from financial resources at home. Thus our revolutionary prestige was enhanced in their eyes. I heard, however, that Austrian agents denounced us to the French as being subsidized by Austria, and there were even people who maintained that we were tools of Germany! The ways of Austrian and German propaganda were truly wonderful. My standpoint was and is that we had a right to a State of our own