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THE MAKING OF A STATE

philosopher, Eduard von Hartmann, advocated the extermination of the Poles, while the historian, Mommsen, taught that Czech skulls should be cracked. In German diplomacy, with its aggressive, ruthless, domineering and impatient character, a corresponding tendency prevailed. On the one hand, pan-German doctrine was the expression of actual practice; on the other, its teaching that the Germans were a “ruling race” fashioned the whole policy of Germany and Austria. In this spirit German philosophers and lawyers exalted violence into an ethical and juridical principle. It was the Germans who most zealously developed the theory that right proceeds from might and force, and it was they who, at the same time, practised it most effectually and ruthlessly. In lands where public opinion had thus been pervaded by aggressive militarism, where uncompromising pan-Germanism became the creed of civilians and officers alike, where the army was kept in constant readiness, the State and, with it, the people, rushed light-mindedly into war as soon as opportunity offered. The Sarajevo outrage offered it.

The thesis of Treitschke and, after him, of all the theorists of the German Drang nach Osten—that it has ever been the task of Germany to colonize the East and, in particular, to subjugate the Slavs—may explain though it cannot justify this aggressive education of the German people. It is clear from the secret Austro-German Treaty of 1909, which made the true meaning of the Triple Alliance clear, that Austria and Prussia-Germany were always thinking of war. (The Viennese editor, Dr. Kanner, has rightly drawn attention to this Treaty.) But, in Allied countries, the whole onus of guilt was somewhat one-sidedly thrown on to the Germans, less attention being paid to Austria because the conflict with her was indirect. Yet Austria bears a great part of the guilt, and her fate and her punishment have rightly been proportionate to it. Austria had a right to demand, as she did demand—though, oddly enough, rather late—satisfaction for the Sarajevo outrage. On this point all States were agreed. But Austria was to blame for having risked and provoked war with Russia by her exaggerated claims upon Serbia. After the Sarajevo outrage it was falsely declared in Vienna and Budapest that the Serbian Government had instigated it. The Serbian protest had no effect. A Serbian warning of the possibility of an outrage was given in Vienna, as is shown in Professor Denis’s book on Serbia and as the recent Memoirs of Biliński, the former Austro-Hungarian Minister, confirm. Under Count Berchtold the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office