building. This act was, of course, a grievous lapse from the dignity that befits a king, but under the circumstances there is much to say by way of excuse. On the whole, it must be considered a mistake so far as the country at large is concerned, for it set in motion a new set of factors which probably did more harm than the temporary enforced seclusion of the King could have done. It acted as a potent factor in embittering the Japanese against Russia, and opened the door for Russian intrigue, which finally hastened if it did not actually cause the Russo-Japanese war. Had Japan been able to preserve the predominance which she held in Korea just after the China-Japan war, she might have looked with more or less complacency upon the Russian aggression in Manchuria, but when Korea itself became disputed ground the war was inevitable.
At seven o'clock on the morning of the 11th of February the King and the Crown Prince entered the Russian legation. Several hours elapsed before the Cabinet in the palace became aware of the fact. During that interval active operations were going on at the Russian legation. The organisation of a new Cabinet was hastened by summoning from various parts of the city such officials as the King could trust. Pak Chong-yang was made prime minister. No time was lost in putting out a royal edict deprecating the necessity of taking refuge in a foreign legation, promising to punish the real authors of the Queen's assassination, rescinding the order for cutting the top-knots. This was posted on the gates of the legation and at various points throughout the city.
