included in designing it. And after all, what are mathematics but a kind of machine of this order?
Just as Kant’s champions are always accusing their opponents of not understanding the master, so, I surmise, must there be not a few who think Kant right because they understand him. His treatment is new, and deviates considerably from the common; and as soon as we once gain an insight into it, we are very much inclined to think it true, especially as it boasts so many and zealous adherents. We should, however, consider that to apprehend a philosophy in this way is no reason for thinking it true. The satisfaction of mastering an extremely abstract and obscure system seems to me, to lead the majority of his readers into assuming that it is thereby demonstrated.
Our idea of a “soul” is not unlike the conception of there being a magnet in the earth. It is a mere figure of thought. But to conceive of all things under this form is a device innate in man.
We are a great deal more certain that our will is free than that everything that happens is bound to have a cause. This being the case, could we not for once in a way reverse the argument, and say: Our ideas of cause and effect must be very inaccurate, for were they right, our will could not be free?
Even our constant misapprehensions have the
