How could we leave an isolated company, at such a great distance from the centre of action, at a time when the French were already occupying Acapulco, Guaymas, and Mazatlan on the Pacific, and Matamoros, Tampico, Vera Cruz, Alvarado, Sisal, and Campeachy on the Gulf, all dangerous and unhealthy posts, where even the Mexican troops did not stay for long? It must be understood also that, although financial resources began to diminish to an extent which caused anxiety, the Mexican minister of war could not plead as an excuse for the insurrectionary movements, which were now assuming a decided shape, that he was in want of soldiers to oppose to the rebels; the fact was that he either left the troops unemployed or did not know how to employ them effectively. Tranquillity was insured in every place which saw the gleam of the French bayonet. A glance at the official and veracious list of the forces which the empire had at its disposal at this time—critical by the curtailment of our expeditionary corps—will suffice to prove their adequacy.
On December 31, 1865, the Mexican army reckoned in its ranks—without mentioning a considerable and well-furnished body of artillery—of the national troops (including regulars and the temporary and municipal troops), 35,650 foot soldiers, horsemen,
