sensation. On January 9, 1866, our ministry of foreign affairs sent to its representative a reply to Mr. Seward's communication. The French government announced 'that it was disposed to hasten as much as possible the recall of its troops from Mexico.' Seven days afterwards, the packet conveyed to Mexico M. le Baron Saillard, furnished with confidential instructions.
Not content with this first victory, President Johnson directed that another and still more pressing diplomatic note should be sent to the French legation; it was dated February 12. After having assumed as settled that the recall of our troops was laid down as a principle, it demanded the fixture of an exact date, which would quiet the susceptibilities of his fellow-citizens. Maximilian was, as we see, abruptly sacrificed, and found himself henceforth at the mercy of the United States, which now ruled the French policy on the continent of America. This second diplomatic document, in fifteen pages of which Mr. Seward discussed with inexorable logic all M. Drouyn de Lhuys' dilatory arguments, left no room either for intentional or unintentional delays; and the purport as well as the form of it are so curious a study, if read in the light of the events about to be detailed, that we must here quote some instructive passages of it. The light that will be reflected from them will illumine the whole scene of action.
Note from Mr. Seward to the Marquis de Montholon, the French Minister.
Washington, February 12, 1866.
Sir,—I had the honour, on December 6, of addressing to you, for the information of the emperor, a written communication on the subject of Mexican affairs, so far as they are affected by the presence of the French armed force in that country.
