the poverty of the treasury, and appealing to the devotion of the commander-in-chief that he would not yet return to Europe, as he was preparing to do with the first troops going home, but that he would undertake the charge of the evacuation until its completion. Maximilian had himself testified to the commander of the expeditionary corps his entire satisfaction with such a measure. But in spite of all this, the Mexican court allowed itself to be persuaded into begging that a much larger French force should be sent, and that large credits should be opened; and on account of the resistance from head-quarters to these projects, it was convinced that the marshal was the only obstacle to fresh sacrifices being made by our country, which would, in its opinion, ensure triumph to the cause. This court had unfortunately entertained the idea that France was still quite inclined to come to their help. But the marshal, who since the end of 1865 had been thoroughly enlightened, both as to the intentions of the cabinet of the Tuileries, and also as to the course public opinion was taking in France and in the United States, would in no way ask for an augmentation of forces, which would have been certainly refused. His personal opinion was that we had wasted enough, both of men and money; and, as he never failed to represent to Maximilian himself, he had been too much struck by the weakness of the Mexican element to consent to plunge his country into fresh dangers. The Mexican sovereign was right in seeking for further resources for his country, and the marshal would have been proud of commanding a more imposing army; but would not France have cried out if one of her generals had led away some thousands of men more? What a fatal story would there have been to tell to-day! Some believed, and will continue to believe, that an increase
