parole), and had since waged an implacable war against us,—a war dictated by personal ambition alone. This general had seemed to be the most formidable competitor that we could oppose to Juarez, both from the influence he wielded, and from the legal right he had to succeed to the former president, whose powers, according to the republican constitution, would have already expired had there been a state of peace.
This was not the way the United States looked at the matter. Until the country was tranquillised, they had neither recognised, nor intended to recognise, any one but the old Indian as the real chief of the nation. As soon as the Washington cabinet was advised of the mission of General Castelnau, it planned the mission of Mr. Campbell and General Sherman. This embassy was originated by President Johnson, who fancied that he should strengthen his somewhat compromised position by certain acts of foreign policy calculated to flatter the American pride: it was intended to rally round Juarez the principal republican chiefs, and to put a stop to the efforts of Ortega. The really important man in this mission was General Sherman—a high-minded and conciliatory man. Campbell only played a secondary part. A secretary of legation was associated with them, who had lived a long time in Mexico: he was a man of ardent temperament and rather disposed to strong measures. By quoting the instructions given by the White House to these two principal personages, we shall understand the attitude which the American government were then taking both towards Mexico and towards France.
Instructions from Mr. Seward to Mr. Campbell.
Washington, October 22, 1866.
