had much comforted him. But the last despatch from Compiègne had put an end to these deceptions. Domestic questions, too, now began to add their part to the causes for discouragement.
The clergy fulfilled but badly their promises of cooperation; Miramon was certainly preparing for his campaign in the North, but the vacancies in the ranks of the Mexican army caused by the numerous desertions were no better filled up than the deficiency in the treasury. The spectre of bankruptcy was always menacing them. The rebels were gaining ground every day. As the state capitals were evacuated by the expeditionary corps, the transfer of each place into the hands of the imperial guards was carried out, as regularly as it would have been in Europe, by the means of our artillery and engineer officers. Duly signed official statements prove that not a single Mexican town was delivered up to the rebels by the French, and that Maximilian's troops were left in possession of all the fortified places, which also had been put in an efficient state of defence. It is true enough that a few days after, often even the very next day, the imperial commissioners repeatedly directed the abandonment of places, without even firing a shot.
The programme traced out for Maximilian by M. Eloïn had therefore the immediate effect of placing him in a fresh cul-de-sac, an exit from which his honour rendered difficult. How could the sovereign have flattered himself even for a moment that he should be able to assemble a congress? Was not the continual increase in the insurrection an insuperable barrier in the way of the 'notables' of distant provinces who might have consented to venture across a country disturbed by enemies, in order to come to a deliberation at Mexico? Did not this immense 'raising of bucklers'
