stricken confusion. The command was given to retire, and to abandon the positions already taken, the maintenance of which appeared too much out of order or too perilous. And, after this sanguinary evening, the French were compelled to be content with attacking and capturing blocks of houses every night in succession, which were dearly bought, and were then lost and taken again; proceeding in this methodical way, and being stopped at some prearranged limit, as if to check the enthusiasm of the troops, they thus clearly indicated to the enemies the point that would be attacked the next day, always allowing them eighteen hours' respite to double their lines of barricade, and to pierce loop-holes, through which, sheltered and invisible, they could shoot down our soldiers, advancing full-fronted in the darkness.
Thanks to this system—condemned by all military men distinguished for their experience—this dreadful siege lasted three days longer than that of Saragossa; and but for the fortunate attack on the fort of Totimehuacan, causing the fall of the town, preparations must have been made to undergo the rains of winter in front of the entrenchments of Puebla. The cerro San Juan, where the French head-quarters were fixed, had been already covered with wooden barracks and mud huts intended for the troops. The inadequacy of our cannon was not noticed until after the siege had commenced, and it became necessary to send the Commandant Bruat to procure rifled guns of large calibre from the fleet.
After the capitulation of Puebla, the march on Mexico would certainly have been put off but for the interposition of the generals of division. This mere wantonness would have had the effect of causing another siege, for Mexico was surrounded with works
