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could be made, for this terrible outrage, and a surrender of those by whose orders it had been committed. Will Englishmen believe that, instead of taking this course, Her Majesty's Government have apparently treated the incident as one of ordinary warfare, and that in all Lord Kimberley's despatches hitherto laid before Parliament there occurs not only no protest, no remonstrance, no indignation at the "massacre of Bronker's Sprut," but not even a word of regret for the brave soldiers so foully and wantonly murdered? Up to this time, British soldiers, fighting in a foreign land, have known and felt that they have the sympathy of their country with them, and that if they fall by treachery or foul practices they will not fall unavenged. It has been reserved for the present Government to teach them a different lesson, but it is one which the true heart of the people of England can still unteach.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon the subsequent incidents of this brief and inglorious struggle. Mr. Sellar tells us that the eyes of the Government "were rudely opened by the disaster at Laing's Nek," and that then they became aware that everybody had been deceived, and that "the annexation was not acquiesced in by the inhabitants." Was ever such a proposition penned by human hand or submitted to the credulity of human understanding? If it be worth anything, it must be equally true and just to assert that if "the disaster" at Laing's Nek had been a victory. Government would have discovered that everybody had been delighted with the annexation and that all official information had been correct?
Judging by the light of subsequent events, there can be little doubt that Sir George Colley committed an error in advancing upon the Transvaal with an inadequate force, and subsequently in yielding to the belief that a small number of Englishmen could accomplish more than it was possible for human prowess to effect in the teeth of an enemy superior in numbers and in a strong position. But, be this as it may. Sir George Colley has atoned for any mistake by dying a soldier's death, with his face to the enemy, and the question which Englishmen have to ask themselves is this: how and why should the disaster of a general and the defeat of the detachments of an army affect the policy of a Government? If we were wrong in annexing the Transvaal, we were wrong long before the rebellion broke out, and a temporary success of rebels should not have altered the matter. If, on the other hand, we were right, that right was in no way affected by a temporary disaster to our troops. The advocates of the Boers, however, and the friends of the Government (alas ! that they should be identical) claim "moral courage" for this "justice-loving" Government in their abandonment to rebels of the country in which they had solemnly declared that the Queen's authority must be re-established. Mr. Chamberlain, moreover, has the effrontery to talk of the course taken by Great Britain having been "a course of oppression and wrong-doing" in which the present Government would not persist, and appeals to public
